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The author in text analyses the European Commission’s Proposal of Shareholders 
Rights Directive  (hereinafter as: Directive 2007/36/EC) revision. A dynamic devel-
opment of European company law demands amendment and improvement in existing 
legal frame. The proposal to revise the existing Directive 2007/36/EC has come as an 
answer to economy crisis in Europe. One main lesson of the crisis is that appropriate 
regulation and supervision of fi nancial sector is necessary to restore fi nancial sta-
bility and confi dence in the markets. Directive 2007/36/EC and its proposed amend-
ment are the fi rst and foremost instruments of company law, with improved corpo-
rate governance as their underlying policy objective. Company law, in the frame 
of European Union, is a fi eld where obligations are imposed to the companies and 
their boards especially for protection of their members and other interested parties. 
Some of these obligations are considered as anachronism and non relevant. For this 
reason, the European Commission is constantly seeking for better solutions.  In the 
proposal, the European Commission wants to give shareholders – and institutional 
investors in particular – a more transparent, easily managed and infl uential role in 
corporate governance. The Proposal focuses on shareholders, but we should bear 
in mind that other actors –employees, consumers and local communities – are also 
highly relevant. For companies to be well - run, there has to be a respect for and 
active engagement from all shareholders. Stimulating stronger shareholder engage-
ment is one of several ways to do that. A set of measures proposed by the European 
Commission is a reasonable step in the right direction. In this context, this is an 
outline of the new legislation highlights.
*  Judge at Commercial Court in Zagreb, tina.jakupak@tszg.pravosudje.hr
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1.  INTRODUCTION
On 9 April 2014, the European Commission presented a proposal to revise Di-
rective 2007/36/EC1 on shareholders rights (hereinafter as: Directive 2007/36/
EC) and Directive 2013/34/EC on the annual fi nancial statements (hereinafter 
as: Directive 2013/34/EC).2 The principal objectives of proposal of Directive 
2007/36/EC are: to increase transparency, to make sure that the internal mar-
ket works in the time of crisis and to invite investors to take their commitments 
seriously. The European Commission wants to improve corporate governance 
of listed companies by engaging the shareholders more. The European Com-
mission wants to activate shareholders in exercising their rights.3 The objective 
of European Commission is to improve and enhance the obligation of com-
pany stakeholders, fi rst of all the institutional shareholders, asset managers, 
proxy advisers, to report. The proposal introduces ‘say on pay’4 and sharehold-
er oversight on related party transaction. 
2. A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY
The “corporate governance” fi rst came into vogue in 1970’s in the United 
States. Within 25 years the corporate governance has become the subject of 
debate worldwide by academics, regulators, executives and investors.5 Corpo-
rate governance and company law are essential to ensure that companies are 
1  Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council od 11 July 2007 on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, OJ L 184, 14.7.2007.
2  Directive 2013/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013on 
the annual fi nancial statements, consolidated fi nancial statements and related reports of certain 
types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC OJ L 182/19, 29 June 
2013
3  More on shareholders rights see in Horak, H., Dumančić, K: Jačanje prava dioničara i pra-
vo dioničara na informacije, Pravni vjesnik : tromjesečni glasnik za pravne i društveno-huma-
nističke znanosti Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta J.J. Strossmayera u Osijeku, quarterly journal 
of law and social sciences of the Law Faculty of University J.J. Strossmayer in Osijek, (2011), 
3/4, str. 191-217
4  „Say on pay“ principle is one of the corporate governance rules. It is prerequisite for tran-
sparency rules regarding companies. More on comply or explain principle and its connection 
with say on pay principle see in Horak, H., Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N.: EU Member States´ Expe-
riences with the „Comply or explain“ Principle in Corporate Governance, Croatian Yearbook 
of European Law and Policy, Vol. 7, Zagreb, 2011.
5  Brian R. Cheffi ns The History of Corporate Governance University of Cambridge - Facul-
ty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), December 1, 2011
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well-governed and sustainable6 in a long-term and therefore have an important 
role to play in a long-term fi nancing of the European economy.
Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which 
a company is directed and controlled.7 In the company, we have to distinguish: 
the management and the shareholders. The company’s management makes de-
cisions in the best interests of the company. The shareholders are the owners of 
companies and they have commitments to the company. They should exercise 
their rights, monitor the company, etc. They should hold company boards ac-
countable. Corporate governance and company law are essential to ensure that 
companies are well-governed. They also have very important role in fi nancing 
the European economy.
Since 1990’s the shareholders activism has been high on the corporate gov-
ernance agenda, as has executive pay (Murphy, 2002: 856-57), and corporate 
governance had a strong international dimension.8
Shareholders activism is the way in which the shareholders can assert their 
power as owners of the company to infl uence its behaviour. Activism cov-
ers a wide spectrum of activities. Activism includes “voting with ones feet” 
(exit), private discussion or public communication with corporate boards and 
management, press campaigns, blogging and other e-ways of public “naming 
and shaming”, openly talking to other shareholders, putting forward the share-
holder resolutions, calling shareholder meetings and – ultimately - seeking to 
replace individual directors or the entire board. In some cases, the sharehold-
ers activism is directed against other large shareholders, not against directors. 
6  Horak, H., Dumančić, K.: Transparency and disclosure as key elements for companies and 
markets, The 2nd International Conference “Legal and Economic Aspects of Corporate Gov-
ernance - Market Transparency and Disclosure in Private and Public Companies” was held on 
3rd and 4th May 2013 in organization of the Jean Monnet Chair/Department of Law Faculty 
of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb and the Judicial Academy of the Republic of 
Croatia, Proceedings 2013.- see more at http://web.efzg.hr/dok/KID/Zbornik%20s%20konfer-
encije%20o%20korp%20%20upr%20%202013%20.pdf
7  Ibid. For defi nitions of corporate governance see also Classens, S., Yurtoglu, B: Cor-
porate governance in emerging markets: A Survey, 2012, available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1988880, p. 4., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance fi rst realised in 1998 and 
last time revised in 2004. Available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprin-
ciples/31557724.pdf., Zingales, L., Corporate Governance. The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=46906 or http://dx-
.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.46906;  Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.: A Survey of Corporate Governance, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 737-783, available http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2329497 . 
8  Brian R. Cheffi ns The History of Corporate Governance University of Cambridge - Facul-
ty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), December 1, 2011
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Shareholders activism can be collaborative, in particular when it is conducted 
in private.9
3.  CROATIAN COMPANIES ACT AND DIRECTIVE 2007/36/EC
Since the Companies Act was introduced the Croatian companies law is ful-
ly harmonized with acquis communautaire.10 As regarding the company law 
the main provisions are contained in the Companies Act. As regarding the 
shareholders rights, the main provisions, among other directives, of the Direc-
tive 2007/36/EC are stipulated by the Companies Act.  The main shareholders 
rights in the Croatian company law are right to vote in the general meeting 
of the company and right to receive a portion of company profi ts.11 There is 
also a right to receive a portion of the remainder of liquidation or bankruptcy 
estate of the company. Pursuant to Article 169 of Companies Act12  each share 
gives the right to vote in the general meeting of the company. Only preferred 
shares may be issued without the right to vote. Shares that provide different 
rights to vote in the general meeting of the company for equal par value shall 
not be permitted. If statutory law or Articles of Association require publica-
tion of company data or announcements, such data or announcements shall be 
published in the Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia. The Articles of 
Association may also stipulate that company information and announcements 
should be also made accessible to the public through other media of public 
communication as well as the electronics informatic media. Under the same 
conditions, the shareholders shall be equal in the company (Article 211. of the 
Companies Act).
9   Shareholder Activism-Available at http://www.ecgi.org/activism/ visited on 14.11.2014.
10  Horak, H.; Dumančić, K.: Harmonisation of the Croatian Company Law with Aquis Com-
munitaire of the European Union, The Business Review, Cambridge, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011 
(Horak,H., Dumančić, K.: Usklađivanje u području prava društava Republike Hrvatske s prav-
nom stečevinom EU, Pravo i porezi, br.5, 2011)
11  Horak,H., Dumančić, K.: Jačanje prava dioničara i pravo dioničara na informacije, Pravni 
vjesnik : tromjesečni glasnik za pravne i društveno-humanističke znanosti Pravnog fakulteta 
Sveučilišta J.J. Strossmayera u Osijeku, quarterly journal of law and social sciences of the Law 
Faculty of University J.J. Strossmayer in Osijek, (2011), 3/4, str. 191-217
12  Companies Act (Offi cial Gazette of Republic of Croatia no. 111/1993, 34/1999, 121/1999, 
52/2000, 118/2003, 107/2007, 146/2008, 137/2009, 111/2012, 125/2011, 68/2013)
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4. REVISION OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE - 
DIRECTIVE 2007/36/EC
The EU fl agship initiative “An industrial policy for the globalisation era” – El-
ements of the Commission s´ Strategy13 as a part of Europe 2020 Strategy high-
lights the importance of improving the business environment, especially for 
SMEs14 and to support the development of a strong and sustainable industrial 
base able to compete globally.15 Different analysis of the shareholders rights ex-
ercise shows a lack of their involvement and use of rights in concrete situations.16 
One of the main reasons for revision of Directive 2007/36/EC was intention to 
„force“ the shareholders to actively participate in realisation of their rights. 
Directive 2007/36/EC implemented the minimum standards relating to the ex-
ercise of shareholders’ rights to vote, and participate in, general meetings as 
well as shareholders’ access to information.
The proposal involves a corporate governance shortcomings relating to list-
ed companies and their boards, shareholders (institutional investors and asset 
managers), intermediaries and proxy advisors. 
4.1. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL
The proposal is based on Article 50(2) (g) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)17 which is the legal basis for Di-
13  European Commission, An industrial policy for the globalization era, MEMO/10/532, ava-
ilable at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-532_en.htm?locale=en
14  Small and medium-sized enterprises are in the focus of numerous strategic EU documents 
and are defi ned as an engine of the European economy. See more on SMEs in The new SME 
defi nition, User guide and model declaration, European Commmission, Enterprise and indus-
try publications, 2005., available at  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/fi les/sme_defi -
nition/sme_user_guide_en.pdf
15  Communication from the Commission Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 220 fi nal-available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/in-
dex_en.htm
16  Horak, H., Dumančić, K.: Jačanje prava dioničara i pravo dioničara na informacije, Pravni 
vjesnik: tromjesečni glasnik za pravne i društveno-humanističke znanosti Pravnog fakulteta 
Sveučilišta J.J. Strossmayera u Osijeku, quarterly journal of law and social sciences of the Law 
Faculty of University J.J. Strossmayer in Osijek, (2011), 3/4, str. 191-217; see also Study on 
monitoring and enforcement pracitces in Corporate Governance in the Member States, Risk-
Metrics Group, 2009., available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/
studies_en.htm 
17  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, OJ C 306 od 17. 12. 2007. -Consolidated versions of the Treaty 
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rective 2007/36/EC. Article 50(2)(g) provides for the EU a competence to act 
in the area of corporate governance. It provides in particular for coordination 
measures concerning the protection of interests of companies’ members and 
other stakeholders, such as creditors, with a view to making such protection 
equivalent throughout the European Union. Article 114 is the legal basis for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market.18
4.2. REASONS FOR REVISION
Directive 2007/36/EC establishes requirements in relation to the exercise of 
certain shareholders rights attaching to voting shares in relation to general 
meetings of companies which have their registered offi ce in a Member State 
and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or 
operating within a Member State.19
The proposal for Revision has been prepared following the 2010 Green Paper 
on corporate governance in fi nancial institutions,20 the 2011 Green Paper on 
the EU corporate governance framework21 and the 2013 Green Paper on a 
long-term fi nancing of the EU economy.22
The European Commission has identifi ed a number of corporate governance 
shortcomings particularly at the level of shareholder control. This is why the 
proposal focuses on the role of shareholders.
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115 od 
9.05.2008. 
18  Document 52014PC0213 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIA-
MENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encoura-
gement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement /* COM/2014/0213 fi nal - 2014/0121 (COD) */ 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN
19  Horak, H., Dumančić, K., Pecotić Kaufman, J.: Uvod u europsko pravo društava, Školska 
knjiga Zagreb, 2010.
20  GREEN PAPER Corporate governance in fi nancial institutions and remuneration policies, 
COM(2010) 285 fi nal, COM(2010) 286 fi nal available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf
21  GREEN PAPER The EU corporate governance framework, COM(2011) 164 fi nal; availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf
22  GREEN PAPER LONG-TERM FINANCING OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 
COM/2013/0150 fi nal, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=-
CELEX:52013DC0150
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The European Commission in Directive 2007/36/EC proposal explanatory 
memorandum says: 
„The impact assessment undertaken by the Commission services identifi ed 
fi ve main issues: 1) Insuffi cient engagement of institutional investors and asset 
managers; 2) Insuffi cient link between pay and performance of directors; 3) 
Lack of shareholder oversight on related party transactions and 4) Inadequate 
transparency of proxy advisors 5) Diffi cult and costly exercise of rights fl ow-
ing from securities for investors.”23
In light of careful assessment of these policy options, it appeared that the fol-
lowing preferred option would best fulfi l the objectives without imposing dis-
proportionate burdens:
1)  Mandatory transparency of institutional investors and asset managers on 
their voting and engagement and certain aspects of asset management ar-
rangements;
2)  Disclosure of the remuneration policy and individual remunerations, com-
bined with a shareholder vote;
3)  Additional transparency and an independent opinion on more important re-
lated party transactions and submission of the most substantial transactions 
to shareholder approval;
4)  Binding disclosure requirements on the methodology and confl icts of inter-
ests of proxy advisors;
5)  Creating a framework to allow listed companies to identify their sharehold-
ers and requiring intermediaries to rapidly transmit information related to 
shareholders and to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights.24
4.3. IMPROVING THE ENGAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
AND ASSET MANAGERS
The emphasis is given to shareholders whose degree of engagement can be 
essential to a long-term sustainability of a company. In that view it is necessary 
that institutional shareholders25 and asset managers develop an engagement 
23  Ibid 10
24  Ibid 10
25 The instutional shareholders are a business, such as a mutual fund, bank or insurance 
company, that holds shares in a publicly-traded company-defi nition available at: http://fi nan-
cialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Institutional+Shareholders
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policy. The practice will show us how institutional investors26 will be able to 
disclose the results of engagement policies. Articles 3f to 3h try to increase the 
transparency of institutional investors and asset managers. 
Article 3f contains a defi nition of ‘engagement policy’ and what engagement 
policy should determine, i.e. how institutional investors and asset managers 
should conduct all of the following actions:
(a) to integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy;
(b) to monitor investee companies, including on their non-fi nancial perfor-
mance;
(c) to conduct dialogues with investee companies;
(d) to exercise voting rights;
(e) to use services provided by proxy advisors;
(f) to cooperate with other shareholders.
Basically, all institutional investors and asset managers should be obliged to 
develop an engagement policy and to be transparent about its application.
Institutional investors and asset managers must publicly disclose their engage-
ment policy and explain how it has been implemented as well as the results of 
the policy. This should include a disclosure, for each company in which they 
hold shares, of how they cast votes in general meeting and an explanation for 
their voting behaviour. Institutional investors must disclose to the public in 
what way their equity investment strategy is aligned with the profi le and dura-
tion of their liabilities and how it contributes to the medium and  to a long-term 
performance of their assets (Article 3g).
Asset managers must disclose to institutional investors how their investment 
strategy complies with the arrangements agreed with the particular institu-
tional investor and how the investment strategy and decisions contribute to the 
medium to long-term performance of the assets of the institutional investor. 27
26  Institutional investors are entities with large amounts to invest such as investment com-
panies, mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds, investment banks and 
endowment funds. Institutional investors are covered by fewer protective regulations because 
it is assumed that they are more knowledgeable and better able to protect themselves. They 
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4.4. STRENGTHENING THE LINK BETWEEN THE REMUNERATION 
AND PERFORMANCE OF DIRECTORS
In the past years, the efforts in remuneration of directors have been made 
through legislation and through corporate governance codes in each of the 
national corporate governance system. The new level of legislation is being 
proposed by this Directive 2007/36/EC.  The European Commission has pro-
posed the following amendments to be adopted by the Member States in due 
course: right to vote on the remuneration policy and information to be dis-
closed in remuneration report and the rights to vote. Listed companies will 
be required to publish a remuneration policy every three years and a remu-
neration report every year setting out how they have paid each director in 
the previous year. Articles 9a and 9b will require listed companies to publish 
detailed and user-friendly information on the remuneration policy and on the 
individual remuneration of directors, while Article 9b empowers the Commis-
sion to provide for a standardized presentation of some of this information in 
an implementing act.28
There are positive sides as to help increase the confi dence in companies by 
giving clear information on remuneration of directors. A balance is needed to 
avoid the negative side effects. Shareholders are entitled, among other things, 
to dismiss the board, if the board does not take appropriate corporate decision. 
So there is a potential negative side effect of mixing up the roles in companies: 
the shareholders’ role and the boards’ role. Besides, different companies have 
different organisational structure, so the question is: Is it necessary to shift the 
competences (and responsibilities) from the board to the shareholders?
Article 9a (3) contain binding inclusion of maximum amounts of total remu-
neration in the policy. Every company has its own specifi cs depending on many 
factors so it is diffi cult to compare indexes of different companies. It should 
have in mind what is important for shareholders and investors: directors’ re-
muneration should ensure that the remuneration is adjusted to their compe-
tence, responsibilities and companies profi t. For a system with remuneration 
policies to be rational and meaningful, the policies cannot too often or too 
much be put to the side. It needs to be clear that there is a difference between 
procedures for establishing the remuneration of directors and systems of wage 
formation for employees.
28  Ibid 18 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN
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4.5. IMPROVING THE SHAREHOLDER OVERSIGHT ON RELATED 
PARTY TRANSACTIONS
When it comes to related party transaction, national legislations have various 
and specifi c conformance. 
The amendment proposes that related party transactions representing more 
than 5% of a listed company’s assets or that can have a “signifi cant impact” on 
profi ts or turnover must be put to a vote of the shareholders in general meeting 
and cannot be completed without the shareholders’ approval. Listed compa-
nies must publicly disclose related party transactions that represent more than 
1% of the listed company’s assets and include a report from an independent 
third party that the transaction is fair and reasonable from the perspective of 
the shareholders, including minority shareholders.29 There should be a proper 
European minimum level to counter a problematic pattern of abusive trans-
actions, but that level does not have to be very high, depending on national 
conditions and practices.
4.6. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY OF PROXY ADVISORS
Proxy advisor means a legal person that provides, on a professional basis, rec-
ommendations to shareholders on the exercise of their voting rights.30
A key problem regarding proxy advisors is that some of them sometimes tend 
to work for different stakeholders at the same time. This is not reasonable.
Under new, not yet adopted, rules the Member States should ensure that proxy 
advisors adopt and implement adequate measures to guarantee that their vot-
ing recommendations are accurate and reliable, based on a thorough analysis 
of all the information that is available to them.31
The role of proxy advisors is increasingly decisive because a great number of 
shareholders engage with companies they are investing in.
29 http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Publication1005Newsletter/UK-Corporate-Update-
16-April2014/Pages/European-Commission-proposes-directive.aspx#sthash.tPornT2j.dpuf
30 Ibid 18 Article 2i Amendments to Directive 2007/36/EC-http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN
31 Ibid 18 Article 3i (1) Amendments to Directive 2007/36/EC-http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN
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4.7.  FACILITATING THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS FLOWING FROM 
SECURITIES FOR INVESTORS
Articles 3a to 3c empower the European Commission to adopt implementing 
acts to ensure an effi cient and effective system of shareholder identifi cation, 
transmission of information and facilitation of exercise of shareholder’s rights, 
and also transparency on costs and third country intermediaries.
Article 3a of the proposal requires Member States to ensure that intermediar-
ies offer to listed companies the possibility to have their shareholders identi-
fi ed. Intermediaries should, on the request of such a company, communicate 
without undue delay the name and contact details of the shareholders.
Article 3b provides that if a listed company chooses not to directly commu-
nicate with its shareholders, the relevant information shall be transmitted to 
them by the intermediary.
Article 3c requires that intermediaries facilitate the exercise of the rights by 
the shareholder, including the right to participate and vote in general meetings 
and requires companies to confi rm the votes cast in general meetings by or on 
behalf of shareholders.32
5. CONCLUSION
The European Commission has recognised that it must harmonise regula-
tion, improve transparency, delete and replace anachronisms and boost the 
cross-border investment. Amending Directive 2007/35/EC is a right way to 
improve a long-term sustainability of EU corporations by identifying and ad-
dressing the gaps in the current European corporate governance regime. How-
ever, the proposal should take into account the differences in the existing laws 
of Member States. It should also preserve the existing fl exibility on companies 
which is required t o encourage entrepreneurship. Directive is not as precise 
as the Regulation and fl exibility is needed for Member States to transpose the 
Directive into the national law,33 taking into account different markets and 
different laws.
Under new rules, key decision and powers are moving from the boards to 
shareholders. Is that a  right way? An effective board consists (or should con-
32  Ibid 18 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN
33  On transposition oft he directives into the national  law see more in Horak, H., Dumančić, 
K..: Problemi implementacije Direktive o uslugama u pravo RH – odustajanje od socijalnog 
modela na nacionalnom  nivou, Zbornik pravnog fakulteta u Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Vol. 32, br.2, 
Rijeka, 2011.
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sist) of individuals with a signifi cant amount of relevant experience, expertise 
and they are placed to oversee the best interests of the company. The board is the 
body where the company’s interest is considered, while in the general meeting 
the opinion and individual interests of shareholders will prevail. By mixing these 
two things, the board and shareholders, may cause a great risk and problems. A 
better way may be the board transparency instead of shareholders engagement 
by providing information about the board and its activities.
To conclude, legislation is easy to propose but it is diffi cult to wind off. Pos-
itive sides of amendment are: larger engagement of shareholders through the 
possibility to vote shares abroad without any obstacles; shareholders should 
have the right to approve the remuneration policy and report of companies 
directors; related party transactions are not transparent for shareholders so it 
is required to provide shareholders with an independent auditor’s report con-
fi rming that the transaction was fair and reasonable. Passivity of shareholders 
is not acceptable.
Other issues are yet to be seen but the European Commission must uphold the 
principle of better regulation.
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